The Truth Spin
Sometimes, honesty really is the best policy
Allan Uthman

[Editor’s note: Obtained from our anonymous source in the White House custodial department, this memo from what appears to be a secret group in the Pentagon formed at the Vice President’s behest proposes a stunning shift in the way the White House talks about the war in Iraq. While we were unable to contact any of the members of the group, we were told by several sources that it had been abruptly dismantled and its members have not been seen or heard from since.]

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

CC: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Senior members, Pentagon Special Public Relations Review Committee

SUBJECT: Initial recommendations

Sirs:

Last year we were commissioned by the Vice President’s office to research and analyze alternative strategies to better manage domestic public relations with regard to the war in Iraq specifically, and more generally the global war on terrorism. While our report is not yet complete, we write to present our preliminary findings and our primary policy recommendation, which will surely be met with some controversy.

As you know, we are waging a military campaign in Iraq to secure major fossil fuel deposits in anticipation of increased global demand for dwindling energy reserves. In anticipation of this, it was deemed necessary to create a more marketable pretext for invasion (WMD, liberating Iraqis from dictatorial oppression) to secure the approval of the media, thereby the voting public, and thereby congress. This public relations effort was quite successful in facilitating said invasion and enjoyed continued success for some time afterward. But, as is painfully obvious, public perceptions have shifted, and a large majority now opposes continued engagement and regrets the invasion.

In hindsight, this shift was in some ways unavoidable: in publicly setting fanciful goals for the invasion, such as finding large caches of dangerous weapons, establishing freedom and security for the Iraqi people and the rebuilding of national infrastructure, the fulfillment of which were not necessary to, and in some cases ran counter to the real policy goal of energy security, we, in a sense, set up plebian war supporters for disappointment. While image maintenance projects such as elections shored up public support in the short term, the lack of any “progress” toward those so-called goals ultimately translates into a failed effort in the eyes of the common citizen.

Such a damning perception of the occupation damages the effort, as can be seen in flagging recruitment levels. But the negative impacts of continued perception management efforts are myriad and cascading. Some major negatives aside from low public and military morale due to perceived failure to achieve fictitious “goals” include diversion of military and funding assets due to efforts to maintain credibility of mission narrative (exacerbated by additional diversion to the Afghanistan operation necessitated by pubic demand following 9/11), and reduced public trust in government due to repeated falsehoods.

This last disadvantage is already negatively affecting the execution of our coming operation in Iran. While public relations efforts to vilify Iran’s president and exaggerate the extent of their nuclear effort have been largely successful, they have met increased skepticism from a media and public still stinging from the WMD claim about Iraq. This skepticism translates into weaker support for the Iran operation than the Iraq operation initially enjoyed.

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